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THE JAY TREATY COMMISSIONS
RICHARD B. LIUcu t
During the past fifteen years the United States has
relied upon the national claims commission device as its
primary method of settling international claims.' These
commissions, established by the United States and manned
by United States citizens, have adjudicated large groups of
claims by Americans against foreign countries.' The present
active national commission, the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, currently is engaged in handling several large
claims programs.3 So successful has this commission and
its predecessors been that only twice since World War II
has the United States resorted to the more traditional
international mixed claims commission.4
Last year the present writer, after comparing the
national with the international claims commission, con-
cluded that the former's ascendancy "was due less to the
t A.B., Oberlin, 1954; LL.B. with Specialization in International Affairs,
Cornell, 1957; LL.M. (in International Law) and J.S.D., New York
University, 1959, 1960. Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Interna-
tional Legal Studies, Syracuse University College of Law. Member of
the New York Bar. On leave, Ford Fellow, London, 1963.
1 See generally LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION
BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS (1962). For suggestions about the mechanics
of preparing and presenting international claims, see LILLICH & CHISTEN-
SON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION
(1962).
2Re, The Foreign Claims Settleinent Commission and International
Claims, 13 SxRACUSE L. RFv. 516, 520-22 (1962).
3 See generally Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Cammission: Its
Functions and Jurisdiction, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1079 (1962).
4 These two commissions were the United States-Japanese Property
Commission, established under Article II of the Agreement With Japan,
June 12, 1952, [1952] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 4054, T.I.A.S. No. 2550, and the
United States-Italian Conciliation Commission, established under Article 83 of
the Treaty of Peace With Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1410, T.I.A.S.
No. 1648.
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superior features of this method of adjudicating claims than
to the inherent defects and repeated failures of mixed claims
commissions." 5 While some commentators were in agree-
ment,' other "doubting Thomases" called for a bill of
particulars.' This article is an attempt to answer the
demand, at least in part, by a case study of the three Jay
Treaty Commissions which "inaugurated the modern era of
international arbitration and introduced a means of adjust-
ment... of disputes arising out of the protection of citizens
abroad." 8 A thorough analysis of these commissions lays
bare both the vices and virtues of the mixed claims com-
mission device.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Henry Adams once remarked that "of all portions of
our national history none has been more often or more
carefully described and discussed than ... Jay's Treaty."I
Granted that the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States '0
has received thorough and frequent evaluation," Adams'
generalization loses validity when applied to the three inter-
national tribunals created pursuant to the treaty. Set up
to adjudicate several sore points between the two countries,
these mixed commissions were, at the time of their creation,
unique in international law. But although they marked
a renaissance in the jurisprudence of the judicial settlement
of international disputes," it generally being conceded that
5 LLICH, opt. cit. supra note 1, at 10.6
"Apart from the notorious delays and complexities of mixed commis-
sions, in which government agents sift and present claims to government
commissioners, the sheer volume of recent claims programs would neces-
sitate national commissions." Levy, Book Review, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 919,
920 (1962). See also Re, suplra note 3, at 1084-85.
7"[T]he reader might wish to know not only that mixed commissions
failed, but also why they failed, why they were too slow and cumbersome
in procedure." Franck, Book Review, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 344 (1962).8 DuNx, THE PROTEacON OF NATIONALS 53 (1932).
9 ADAmS, THE LiFE OF AImERT GAL.LATIN 158 (1879).
10 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105 (effective Feb. 29, 1796).
"lThe most recent authoritative book on the treaty is by BEMIS, JAY'S
TREATY (1923).
121"The end of the 18th century brought a change in the character of
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"the modern era of [International] Arbitration may be
conveniently considered as commencing with the Jay Treaty
of 1794,"13 the commissions have received little scholarly
attention. Their historical importance alone renders them
worthy of study.
When John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
sailed for England on May 12, 1794 , the obstacles in the
way of an amiable accommodation between the United States
and Great Britain seemed insurmountable. "Never, indeed,"
noted one of Jay's biographers, "was a mission undertaken
under a darker cloud of adverse circumstances." 14 The
problems causing friction were twofold: (1) those stem-
ming from unfulfilled and ill-conceived conditions of the
Treaty of Peace of 1783; and (2) those resulting from the
effect on neutrals of England's all-out war against France. 5
On the first count, there can be no denial that the
British, contemptuous of the Confederation and skeptical
of the neophyte Union, had failed to comply with several
provisions of the peace treaty. Although eleven years had
passed since the signing of the pact,
England had never yet carried out, either according to its spirit
or its letter, the treaty of peace. British troops still garrisoned
several posts on our frontiers, and within the jurisdiction of the
international arbitration which had always been of a diplomatic character
but now took on a judicial one through the institution of the so called
Mixed Commissions. Great Britain and the 'United States of America con-
cluded the Jay Treaty on November 19, 1794, whereby for the first time
a mixed commission was created for the settlement of differences between
two States. Soon other States followed their example and gradually this
jurisprudence attained an increasing influence on the development of inter-
national law." STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS at vii
(1939).
13 DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 769 (1904). See HUDsON, INTER-
NATIONAL TRIBUNALS 3 (1944); 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADjUDICATIONs at
x (1929); 2 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (7th ed. 1952); RALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL ARBmRATION FR0 o ATHENS TO LOCARNO 191 (1929). See
also text at note 8 supra.1 4 McVICKAR, LIFE OF JOHN JAY 320 (1841).
15In a futile attempt to force France to surrender, Great Britain
instituted an effective blockade of the French coast. France, unable to
import from her colonies, attempted to circumvent the blockade by grant-
ing certain states the privilege of trading with her colonies and transport-
ing such trade to metropolitan France. England then resorted to the
measures, discussed in the text below, that gave rise to her difficulties with
neutral nations like the United States.
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United States. American citizens were excluded from navigating
the great lakes; and Great Britain had neglected to make com-
pensation for negroes carried away by the British fleet, after the
war.
16
England, however, was not the only offending party, since
several of the American states "had prevented the collection
of debts to English merchants contracted before the
Revolution." 11
On the second count, the British naval-diplomatic policy
of attempting to cut off France from the sea, instigated by
an Order-in-Council of June 8, 1793, was a severe blow to
American shipping and was alleged to be a patent violation
of neutral rights. The order instructed English commanders
to bring into port all neutral vessels carrying corn, flour,
or meal to France. No exception was made for American
ships, as had been the case in a similar French decree.
The American government vigorously protested that such
foodstuffs were not contraband,' 8 but this complaint was met
with a second Order-in-Council of even greater severity.
The Order of November 6, 1793, ordered the capture of "all ships
laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France,
or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such
colony." Hundreds of American ships were plying the Caribbean
and trading with the French West Indies when the British com-
manders swept them from the seas and brought them into British
admiralty courts, where more than one hundred and fifty were
condemned. x9
Although this decree was superseded by a less objectionable
Order on January 8, 1794, much damage already had been
done. Over two hundred and fifty vessels were seized by
I6VAX SANTVOORD, SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND JUDICIAL SERVICES OF
JOHN JAY 64 (1854).17 PE MV, JoHN JAY 269 (1899). See also HILL, LEADING AMERICAN
TRaATrEs 47 (1922).
I8 Foodstuffs were ordinarily not treated as contraband at the time. 2
OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 805.
19 MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY, DEFENSE OF LBFRTY 363 (1935). This order
was not made public until late in December, 1794, allowing British warships
and privateers to seize the choicest prizes before American shippers were
given notice of the new English decree. See also BEmIS, op. cit. supra note
11, at 158.
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March 1, 1794, and of these one hundred and fifty were
condemned. Appeal rights were blocked by the strict ap-
plication of British procedural rules.2" Great Britain, not
to be caught without a counterclaim, alleged with some
justification that her commercial fleet had been raided by
French privateers fitted out in American ports.21
Sitting down with his English counterpart, Lord Gren-
ville, Jay spent the summer of 1794 thrashing out the above
difficulties. Finding the Englishman adamant on the Negro
question, Jay dropped this relatively minor matter. Gren-
ville, on the other hand, conceded the known fact that British
troops were stationed on American soil, conditioning their
removal upon providing for the payment of debts owed
British creditors. Jay, who acknowledged the justice of this
latter claim,22 acquiesced in the demand 2" and a mixed
commission to adjudicate the authenticity of such debts, to
be discussed in section III below, was provided for in
article VI of the proposed treaty. This left the question
of the northern boundary, which turned upon determining
which river was the St. Croix referred to in the peace treaty,
as the sole territorial dispute. This matter was entrusted
by article V to a second mixed commission, to be considered
in section II below.
Turning to maritime matters, Jay urged the establish-
ment of a third mixed commission to handle the compen-
sation cases.24 He recommended
2 0 
'The short time allowed for appeal from the island vice-admiralty
courts to the higher tribunals in England and the temporary lack of funds
of the ship captains, together with the impossibility because of time and
distance to communicate with owners soon enough to start appeals, cut off
all possibility of ultimate justice." BEMIS, op. cit. supra note-ll, at 159. See
also 1 JAY, THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY 325 (1833).
21 PE rL.v, op. cit. supra note 17, at 270.
22 1 JAY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 327.
23 Jay realized that some provision for the payment of these debts would
have to be made. Two months after he arrived in London he wrote President
Washington: "They will, I think, insist that British debts, so far as injured
by lawful impediments, should be repaired by the United States, by decision
of mutual commissioners." 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY 45 (1893).
24 "The compensation cases are described in the answer [of Lord
Grenville], and the amount of damages will, I have reason to hope, be
referred to the decision of commissioners mutually to be appointed by the
two governments." Id. at 44.
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that commissioners should be appointed, who, upon due investiga-
tion, should award compensation for all American vessels and
property that had been illegally captured and condemned during
the existing war, "under colour" of authority and commissions
derived from the king, and for which no redress could be obtained
in his majesty's courts.25
His suggestion was accepted by the English minister, upon
the condition that the commission also have jurisdiction over
British claims arising from French privateers built or
equipped in American ports, and a third commission, to be
considered in section IV below, was established by article
VII. This commission, whose procedure was thought by
Jay to be too cumbersome,26 became the most successful
of the three Jay Treaty Commissions.
ST. CROIX RIVER COMMISSION
Jay's Treaty, signed November 19, 1794, was ratified
by both nations the following year. Ratifications were
exchanged October 28, 1795, and the treaty was proclaimed
on February 29, 1796. Five months later the St. Croix
commissioners had been appointed and this arbitration was
underway. Of this first commission, Moore has written:
The St. Croix River Arbitration enjoys a peculiar preeminence.
As the first of the three distinct arbitrations for which the treaty
* . . provided, it marks the revival in modem times of the practice
of international arbitration.... In this sense it constitutes an epoch
in the history of the application of the judicial method to the
settlement of international disputes. But, while it thus possesses
a world-wide general interest, it also has a profound local sig-
25 1 JAY, op. cit. sz pra note 20, at 326.
2 6 After the treaty was signed he wrote Edmund Randolph, the Secretary
of State: "It is very much to be7 regretted that a more summary method
than the one indicated in the seventh article could not have been devised
and agreed upon for settling the capture cases; every other plan was
perplexed with difficulties, which frustrated it." 4 CORRESPONDENCE, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 140.
27The activities of the commission are described in 1 Moon,, HISTORY
AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 1-44 (1898) [hereinafter cited as MooRE,
HISTORY AND DIGEST].
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nificance, in that it marked the beginning and laid the foundation
of the progressive amicable determination of the boundaries between
the United States and the British dominions in America.
28
The commission, according to article V of the treaty,
was to fix the boundary of the northeast portion of the
United States by determining "what river was truly in-
tended under the name of the river St. Croix," mentioned
in Article II of the Treaty of Peace. Disputes over this
question had dragged on for a dozen years.2 9
Three commissioners were to be appointed to settle the
matter. One was to be named by Great Britain; a second
by the United States; and the third by the first two. If
the first two commissioners could not agree, each was to
propose one person and of the two names proposed one
would be drawn by lot. The first commissioner was named
by King George III in March, 1796 when he selected Thomas
Barclay of Annapolis, Nova Scotia." President Washington,
after selecting General Henry Knox of Massachusetts, who
declined to serve on the ground that he had a personal
interest in the controversy, next appointed David Howell
of Providence, Rhode Island.3 "After some delay and
difficulty these agreed upon Judge Egbert Benson of the
City of New York, as third -Commissioner." 32 Benson, an
American but a relative of Barclay's, was, it seems, also a
personal friend of John Jay.33
The first formal meeting of the trio took place on
October 4, 1796, at St. Andrews, New Brunswick. After
examining the written claim of the British agent who had
been selected to argue the Crown's cause, the commission
secured surveyors to make an extensive survey of the disputed
region and then adjourned until the following August, when
they reconvened on the 11th of the month in Boston, Mass-
achusetts. There they took the testimony of John Adams
281 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS at xcv (1929).
29 Id. at 5-10.
3OId. at 10-11.
31 Id. at 12-13.
32 DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 769 (1904). A sketch of Judge
Benson is given in 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 23 (1929).
333 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 74 (1893).
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and received the written deposition of Jay himself con-
cerning what these men intended as the river St. Croix
when they, as America's representatives, concluded the
Treaty of Peace. The commission heard other witnesses,
examined numerous documentary proofs and studied long,
written arguments by the United States and British agents.
Upon learning that the surveyors had not finished their
task, the commission once again adjourned, agreeing to
meet in June, 1798 at Providence, Rhode Island.
The survey of the Schoodiac River, which England
claimed to be the St. Croix named in the peace treaty,
proving even more time consuming than anticipated, the
Providence session was postponed until August 20, 1798.
Meeting on that date the three commissioners heard final
arguments of the two agents until September 22, 1798,
when they adjourned until October 15, 1798, at which time
they received copies of the complete general map of the
survey. From that date they met daily until the 25th
of the month, when they completed their task and signed
a unanimous award. 4 The Schoodiac River was determined
the St. Croix intended by the treaty, but since the river
separated, the northern branch was deemed that intended as
the boundary.
Moore, in his evaluation of the award, takes issue with
the conclusion that the result was a compromise arrived
at by negotiation rather than by judicial determination.
It certainly is true that the decision did not fully allow the claim
of either party; but it is permissible to take the view that what
appeared . . . to be a "negotiation" rather than a "judicial de-
termination," since it required the abandonment by each of a
part of his contentions, was after all only an example of the
necessary process of adjustment, of the weighing of one consider-
ation against another, by which, in the presence of proofs con-
cerning the effect of which opinions may inevitably differ, con-
current and just human judgments, judicial and otherwise, are
daily reached. Only those unfamiliar with boundary disputes will
suppose that it is as easy to determine a range of hills or mountains
34 2 AMooRE, IN=RNA WNAL ADJUDICATIONS 373-74 (1929).
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or the course of a river on the ground as it is to follow a line
on a map . . . the river was not ascertainable "by calculation
or definite rule." The determination of the question involved the
exercise of "judgment or opinion," of "discernment or discretion,"
and, if a precise result was to be reached, of a sentiment of
accommodation. 35
Article V specified that the award of the commission
was to be "final and conclusive, so that the same shall never
thereafter be called into question, or made the subject of
dispute or difference between them." The decision was so
treated and the precedent of an arbitration's finality estab-
lished for subsequent commissions.3 6
The St. Croix River Commission, with a pedestrian
problem to adjudicate, added little to the substantive law
of international claims. It did, however, resolve a hotly
contested boundary question which could have led to serious
difficulties, and it served to usher in a new era in the
judicial settlement of international claims.
THE BRITISH D1EBrs COMMISSION
The British Debts Commission, created by article VI
to award compensation to British creditors of American
debtors, was a more interesting if less successful tribunal."
To understand the duties of the commission, it is necessary
to have a general knowledge of the history of the underlying
obligations which foreshadowed its creation.
At the outbreak of the Revolution, many colonists owed
substantial sums to British merchants. The collection of
these debts was specifically guaranteed by Article IV of the
Treaty of Peace, which provided: "It is agreed that cred-
1' Id. at 367-68. It is certainly incorrect to say, as Darby does, that thc
award was in favor of the United States, or that the United States con-
tended that the Schoodiac River was intended under the name of the St.
Croix, DARBY, op. cit. sufrra note 32, at 771-72.
36 Hudson writes: "Once a decision on the merits is pronounced by an
international tribunal it becomes definitive and final." HUDSON, INTrn.NA-
TIONAL TRIBUNALS 121 (1944). He cites the St. Croix Commission as his
example.
37 The history of this commission is recorded in 1 MOORE, HISTORY AND
DIGEST 271-98 (1898).
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itors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediments
to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all
bona fide debts heretofore contracted." " When a British
creditor sought recovery in state courts, however, he was
generally met with a plea of discharge, based upon a state
confiscation act which authorized the payment of debts due
Englishmen into state treasuries and made such payment a
full discharge of the debtor's obligation. Thus, although the
treaty provided for the- recovery of debts,
the Government of the United States was unable to execute it.
The States refused to repeal their impeditive enactments, and the
State courts continued to enforce them. The government of the
confederation was practically powerless, and unable to afford a
remedy.39
With the adoption of the Constitution, there was hope
that the difficulty had been removed. Article VI, section II
of that document, the so-called "supremacy" clause, provided
in part that:
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the con-
stitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
As Moore explains:
The first object of this clause was to secure the execution of the
obligation imposed by the fourth article of the treaty of peace;
indeed, it was the non-application by the State courts of this
article in opposition to impeditive State enactments that led the
convention to insert the specific provision that all treaties "made,"
or thereafter to be made, should be binding on "the Judges in
388 Stat. 82 (effective Jsan. 14, 1784). This article, which con-
cerned the payment of debts, must be clearly distinguished from article
V, which dealt with the compensation of loyalists for the loss of their
estates. In the case of the latter the United States refused to assume
liability, it merely being stipulated that Congress should earnestly recom-
mend that the state legislatures provide for the restitution of confiscated
estates or for the payment of claims for losses on account of such con-
fiscation. See 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 17 (1929).
39 1 MooRE, HISTORY AND DIGEST 273 (1898).
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every State," in spite of anything in its constitution or laws to
the contrary.4 0
But despite the protestations of the United States that
the above constitutional provision, coupled with the organ-
ization of the federal courts, had removed all obstacles
to the recovery of British debts, England remained un-
convinced. This posture had some justification, since numer-
ous state courts were still upholding discriminatory state
legislation despite the complex of the supremacy clause and
Article IV of the Treaty of Peace.4  Walre v. Hylton,"4
a sweeping decision of the Supreme Court upholding article
IV over state acts and binding both federal and state courts,
was yet to come. Thus when Jay arrived in London in
the summer of 1794, he found the Foreign Office insistent
upon treating the debts as international claims rather than
as a judicial question which should be left to American
courts. Jay, soon realizing that his yielding on this point
was the sine qua non of a commercial treaty, agreed to
the inclusion of these claims under Article VI of the Jay
Treaty.
This article recited that bona fide debts contracted
before the peace remained owing to Britishers by citizens
or residents of the United States; "that by operation of
various lawful impediments since the peace" the recovery
of the debts had been delayed and the security thereof
impaired; and "that, by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, the British creditors" could not obtain full
compensation for these debts. Therefore, it was agreed that
"in all such cases, where full compensation for such losses
and damages cannot, for whatever reason, be actually ob-
403 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 13 (1929).
41 Id. at 173-74. See also Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393
(1788).
423 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). In this classic case a debt due from
a Virginian to a Britisher had been paid into the Virginia treasury, pursuant
to a state sequestering statute, and the debtor had been discharged. The
Supreme Court held that Article IV of the Treaty of Peace gave the
creditor an action against his debtor notwithstanding the state law. See
also Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806), holding that the
same article prevented the operation of a Virginia statute of limitations
upon British debts contracted before the peace treaty.
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tained, had and received by the said creditors in the ordinary
course of justice, the United States will make full and
complete compensation for the same to the said creditors."
However, the application of this stipulation was specifically
limited to "such losses only as have been occasioned by the
lawful impediments aforesaid, and it is not to extend to
losses occasioned by such insolvency of the debtors or other
causes as would equally have operated to produce such
loss, if the said impediments had not existed; nor to such
losses or damages as have been occasioned by the manifest
delay or negligence, or wilful omission of the claimant."
To ascertain the amount of such losses and damages,
five commissioners were to be appointed; two by Great
Britain, two by the United States, and the fifth by the
four's unanimous vote. If the four could not agree, the
commissioners of the two parties were each to propose one
person, one of which was to be drawn by lot in the presence
of the four original commissioners. At their first meeting
they were to take an oath to render their awards "according
to justice and equity." Three of the commissioners were
to constitute a board with power to do any act pertaining
to the commission, provided that one named by each nation
plus the fifth commissioner were present. Decisions were
to be made by a majority of the commissioners present.
The commissioners were to meet first in Philadelphia and
were to receive claims for eighteen months from the day
they should first form; this period could be extended in
particular cases for a term not to exceed six months.
The commissioners were granted the power to examine
those who came before them under oath and to receive in
evidence depositions or writings "being duly authenticated,
either according to the legal form now respectively existing
in the two countries, or in such other manner as the said
commissioners shall see cause to require or allow." The
award of any three commissioners, provided one was from
each country and the third, the fifth commissioner, was to
be "final and conclusive, both as to the justice of the claim,
and to the amount of the sum to be paid to the creditor or
claimant."
193]
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Great Britain appointed Thomas Macdonald and Henry
Pye Rich as its commissioners, while the United States was
represented by Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania and
James Innes of Virginia.43  The four original commissioners
met in Philadelphia on May 18, 1797, and, being unable to
agree to a fifth commissioner, chose John Guillemard, a
Britisher living in the city, by lot. After receiving claims
in the amount of $25,000,000, the commission began its
consideration of the same in January, 1798. Both countries
appointed agents and the commission laid down rules with
regard to the reception of claims, which required the claim-
ant or his agent to appear before the commission.4 4 Rules
as to evidence, especially evidence concerning the solvency
or insolvency of the debtor, were also promulgated."
Once into the consideration of claims, it became ap-
parent that the two British commissioners (joined by their
fifth "British" colleague) and the two American commis-
sioners were hopelessly split on several key questions con-
cerning the construction of article VI. These questions
were:
1) The question of interest. The British contended
that the word "debts" comprehended full interest in all
cases for the detention and delay of payment during the
war.46  The Americans argued that the commission could
award or refuse interest, in whole or in part, as the merits
of each individual case warranted. 7
2) The question, of solvency. The British took the
view that claimants did not have to prove the solvency of
their debtors as a condition to recovery.4 The Americans
construed the article not to call for a presumption of sol-
vency, thus relieving the United States of the burden of
proving insolvency to avoid the payment of a claim.4 9
43 The latter died and was replaced in August, 1798 by Samuel Sit-
greaves of Pennsylvania.
44 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONs 26-29 (1929).
45 Id. at 32-35.4 6 Id. at 77, 325.
4 7 Id. at 79.4 8 Id. at 59, 67, 324.
4 9 Id. at 68, 283.
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3) The question of exhaustion of local remedies. The
British considered that the commission should weigh claims
in all instances where lawful impediments had stood at the
time of the treaty's adoption in 1794, despite the fact that
Ware v. Hylton had declared these impediments unlawful
and despite the fact that the claimant had made no effort
to pursue a remedy in an American court.5" The Americans
held that a lawful impediment had to exist at the time the
claim was presented, and that "the mere delay of recovery,
by the operation of lawful impediments is [not], of itself, a
sufficient foundation for a claim; it must be such a delay
as has produced a loss which cannot be repaired in the
ordinary course of justice." "' No claimant, they argued,
had standing before the board until he had attempted and
failed to secure a judicial remedy.52
4) The question of eligibility. The British thought
that all natural-born British subjects who had had debts
confiscated and were on the side of England at the time
of the peace could, as British subjects, present claims.5 3
The Americans, while admitting that those loyalists who had
declared for Great Britain from the first should have stand-
ing before the board, 4 denied such status to those who
had first sided with the colonists and later switched to the
British."
The net effect of the four above differences, if re-
solved in favor of the British, would have been to place
the United States in the position of having to respond to
almost every claim by one alleging British citizenship at
the time of peace. The American commissioners, being
unable to crack the three-man British majority on any vote,56
resorted to the questionable practice of leaving the sessions
50 Id. at 59, 115, 324-25.
"' Id. at 122.
52 Id. at 164-65.
5 Id. at 242.
54 Id. at 99.55 Id. at 238, 299.
56 It is interesting to note that, while there were unanimous decisions of
the commission, there was no decision where any of the three Britshers voted
with the two Americans when the commission was split. Id. at 264.
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prior to an anticipated unfavorable vote, thereby blocking
any action by the commission, which needed one commis-
sioner present from each side before it could take action.
Unfortunately for the work of the commission, these
disputes arose immediately after its inception, causing the
commission's untimely demise before it had made a dent
in the pile of claims. That the disputed points were brought
to a head immediately was no accident; Thomas Macdonald,
the British commissioner who spoke for the majority, wished
to settle basic principles at the beginning and apply them
to large batches of claims, rather than examine each case
individually and determine the facts and the law thereof.57
To effect his approach, Macdonald submitted some general
rules at a very early session, all of which were favorable
to England, which he suggested that the commission follow."
These rules and the manner in which they were presented
greatly annoyed the American commissioners. In addition
they were irked by Macdonald's assertion that English courts
considered the United States to have been in a state of
rebellion, rather than being independent states engaged in
war, during the period from 1775 to 1783."9 Little modera-
tion was shown on either side following this incident, as
the correspondence between the commissioners after their
final breach indicates."
This breach, which occurred in the fall of 1799, assured
the commission's failure. Rufus King, United States min-
ister at London, was instructed to negotiate a new con-
vention to spell out America's obligations under article VI.
King presented a draft to Lord Grenville in April 1800, but
he soon found that the latter "was not inclined either to
negotiate a new convention or to discuss the question of
a lump sum." 61 Finally, Lord Grenville agreed to a lump
57 Id. at 263.58 Id. at 58-59.
59 Id. at 279. His argument went to the question of eligibility. If the
states were only in rebellion, all loyalists retained their British citizenship
throughout the period. If the states were independent, however, loyalists
could have become American citizens before later siding with the British.
60 Id. at 268-326.
61 Id. at 353.
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sum settlement, and on January 8, 1802, a convention was
concluded whereby article VI of the treaty of 1794 was
annulled and the sum of £600,000 was accepted by Great
Britain in satisfaction of the liability of the United States
under the article.62
In assessing the reasons for the commission's failure,
prime responsibility must be assigned to the drafters of
article VI. While the terms of the article read easily,
an examination of the indicated points in dispute readily
shows that the original treaty provision was drafted without
profound regard for the complex substantive and procedural
problems the commissioners were to face. In approaching
difficult problems the commission, unlike its maritime claims
counterpart, had no body of international law on which
to draw. Reference to municipal law to determine such
issues as the status of the states from 1775 to 1783 and
the relation of federal treaties to state laws under the
Constitution inevitably resulted in conflicting opinions.
Furthermore, unlike the St. Croix Commission, no spirit of
accommodation was present among the commissioners. Moore
has observed:
One can hardly study the records of the commission under Article
VI without perceiving that, quite apart from the exceptional
intricacy and indefiniteness of some of the problems which the
commissioners were required to solve, personal irritation and
exasperation more and more stood in the way of the progressive
and harmonious disposition of the questions at issue and at length
directly contributed to the final suspension of proceedings. 63
The record of the British Debts Commission, then, is
a lesson in the need for careful draftsmanship when creat-
ing international tribunals to assess the liability of states,
and in the need for some specificity as to the substantive
and procedural law which the commission is to apply. The
62 Convention With Great Britain, Jan. 8, 1802, 8 Stat. 196, T.S. No. 108.
The failure of this commission led to the first utilization by the United
States of the lump sum settlement-national claims commission device.
See LnLIcH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEm ADJuDIcATIoN Dy NATIONAL
COMMISSIONS 7 (1962).634 MOOE, INTENATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 103 (1929).
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brevity of the commission's sessions, its lack of decisions
and its special problems rendered it devoid of useful prece-
dent. Perhaps the best evaluation of its work can be found
in a single succinct sentence by Hill: "This board met and
remained in session for two years but accomplished nothing
because of disagreements." "
THE MARITIME CLAIAIS COMMISSION
The routine problem of the St. Croix Commission and
the failure of the British Debts Commission has caused one
international lawyer to note that "from the point of view
of its contributions to international law, the third com-
mission formed under the seventh article of the Jay Treaty
was by far the most important." 11 This commission, it will
be remembered, was created to handle the complaints of
Americans against Great Britain arising from the irregular
or illegal captures or condemnations of American vessels
and other property under color of authority or commissions
from England (article VII), as well as British complaints
on American outfitting of privateers (article VIII). Five
commissioners were to decide claims that came before them
"according to the merits of the several cases, and to justice,
equity, and the law of nations." 66 Despite the importance
and success of this commission's work, its "proceedings have
been strangely neglected by historians, though it is one of
the most important in the history of arbitration." 67
64HILL, LEADING AMERICAN TREATIES 53 (1922). Hill is on less solid
ground when he continues: "The board revived its sessions after the Treaty
of 1802 had provided that the United States should appropriate $2,664,000
for the purpose." This statement is incorrect, since England set up a
purely national commission for the adjudication of the claims and the
distribution of the indemnity. 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS
359 (1929). It was the Maritime Claims Commission that was reactivated
after the 1802 Convention.
6 5RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LACARNO
192 (1929). For a description of the commission's work, see 1 MooRE, HISTORY
AND DIGEST 299-349 (1898).
66Article VI provided only that claims be decided according to "justice
and equity." The inclusion in article VII of "the laws of nations" was a
diplomatic victory for Jay, since it "virtually abrogated the orders in council,
as affording any justification for the captures under them." 1 JAY, THE LIFE
OF JOHN JAY 326 (1833).6 7
MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE 61 (1911).
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The commissioners under articles VII-VIII were to be
appointed in a manner similar to their debt commission
brethren. Great Britain appointed John Nicholl,6" who had
been acting as London counsel for the United States, and
John Antsey; 11 both men were highly satisfactory from
the American viewpoint. President Washington appointed
Christopher Gore 70 of Massachusetts and William Pinkney7'
of Maryland. The four met in London on August 16, 1796,
and nine days later, having been unable to agree unanimously
on a fifth, selected Colonel John Trumbull,72 the American
artist, by lot. The quintet formed an able and distinguished
commission.
The commissioners sat down to business on October
10, 1796, and were immediately presented with a problem
that nearly caused the commission's termination. The issue
involved The Betsey, and in dispute was whether a decision
of the Lords Commissioners of Appeal in Prize Causes, the
highest English prize court, which affirmed the sentence of
condemnation of a lower prize court, was conclusively binding
on the commission. The British commissioners contended
that the board had no jurisdiction to "reverse" the Lords
Commissioners and make an award. The Americans,
admitting the finality of the decision as to the title of the
property concerned, argued that the commission had ju-
risdiction to consider the merits of the claim and possibly
give redress, not by reversing the Lords and restoring the
vessel but by awarding compensation. The British com-
missioners having withdrawn to prevent action on the ques-
tion, 73 resort was had to Lord Chancellor Loughborough,
k
684 MooRF, INTERNATIONAL ADJtmIcATIoNs 63 (1929). He resigned in
November 1798 and was followed by Maurice Swabey.
69 Id. at 64.70 1d. at 64-65.
71 See Lillich, William Pinkney: Thc Legal Colossus, 41 THE SPEAxER
11 (1958).
724 MooREo, INTERNATIONAL ArJuDICATioNS 72 (1929). Colonel Trumbull
was far less partisan than his counterpart on the British Debts Commission,
John Guillemard. The selection of a moderate was helped by having each
side pick, from a panel of proposed names, the nominee of the other. In
the case of the commission meeting at Philadelphia, each side had merely
nominated one of its nationals.73 Thus both the United States and Great Britain made use of the ques-
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who advised the group that "'the reasons assigned . .
against the jurisdiction of the commissioners, or in bar
of the claim, are the very cases which it was intended
should be examined and decided by the commissioners."'
Following this opinion, awards were made by the com-
mission whenever the condemnation appeared unjust.
During the course of the disagreement, it was suggested
that future embarrassments were bound to occur if, upon any
challenge to jurisdiction, the commissioners had to refer
to one or both of their respective governments rather than
ruling on the matter themselves. The Lord Chancellor,
answering this question, "declared that 'the doubt respecting
the authority of the commissioners to settle their own ju-
risdiction was absurd, and that they must necessarily decide
upon cases being within, or without their competency.' " "7
Thus one potential source of friction, questions of juris-
diction, was kept within the judicial bounds of the mixed
commission and without the area of further international
negotiation. Carlston has called this decision "one of the
earliest and most notable instances in which the power
of an international commission to decide questions of its
own jurisdiction was upheld." "
The second major problem which confronted the com-
mission was the question of the exhaustion of local remedies
and when failure to have exhausted them was excusable.
A large number of claims were pending before the Lords
Commissioners awaiting their final decision, and the question
was raised whether the commission could take jurisdiction
of these pending cases. It was finally decided that while
judicial remedies, through an appeal to the Lords, had to
be exhausted, once that tribunal had confirmed a decree
tionable technique of the walkout. Hudson concludes that, although the
quorum problem arose twice and was much debated, "no definite solution
was given to it." HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 53 (1944).
744 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 811 (1929).7 5 
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROMt ATHENS TO LACARNO
193 (1929).
76 CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 75 (1946).
See also the discussion of the question in 6 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 697 (1906).
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of restitution the necessity of the claimant seeking to compel
the captors to comply with the decree was obviated. The
commission was to make awards in such cases and the
British government, by virtue of assignments provided for
in the treaty, would then seek recovery from the captors.7
The third major question that came before the com-
missioners involved the definition of contraband. In the
case of The Neptune," an American ship loaded with food-
stuffs headed for France was captured and taken into a
British port. Eventually the vessel was restored, but the
British government paid the owners less for the cargo than
its market price either in London or the intended French
port. The owners claimed the difference in price between
what was paid them and what they would have received had
the ship not been seized and had reached France. When
the claim came before the commission, the owners were
successful by a three-to-two vote. The British agent asserted
that the foodstuffs were contraband, claiming that they should
be so classed and the applicable Order-in-Council justified
because England had been attempting to bring France to
terms by famine and because England herself was threatened
with a scarcity of those articles directed to be seized. The
majority, however, held "that so far as authorities of writers
on the law of nations can influence this question, the orders
of 1795 cannot be rested upon any just notion of contraband.
Nor can they in that view be justified by the reasons of
the thing or the approved usage of nations." 11 Hence the
concept of contraband was kept within its historically ac-
cepted bounds.
The commission's activities were interrupted on July
20, 1799, when the two British commissioners withdrew in
retaliation for the withdrawal of America's two commis-
sioners on the British Debts Commission. Proceedings
remained suspended until the Convention of 1802, article
III of which provided that the commissioners under article
VII of the Jay Treaty should reassemble and resume their
774 MOORE, INT NATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 99-100 (1929).
781d. at 372.
79 Id. at 387.
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duties. This they did in February of that year. One
of their first decisions upon reconvening was to hold that
interest accrued on compensable claims during the retaliatory
suspension of the commission. 0
In addition to important questions relating to illegal
interference with American shipping, the commissioners
spent considerable time weighing neutrality claims against
the United States. Article VIII provided that this country
would stand liable for the losses of British merchants "by
reason of the capture of their vessels and merchandise, taken
within the limits and jurisdiction of the States and brought
into the ports of the same, or taken by vessels originally
armed in ports of the said States." The decisions of the
commission, especially relating to the last clause above,
were fruitful precedent for the so-called Alabama Claims
in 1872.81
When the commission concluded its business on Feb-
ruary 24, 1804, it had awarded $11,650,000 to American
claimants and $143,428.14 to British claimants, 2 fulfilling
John Jay's main objective in negotiating the treaty that
bears his name-the compensation for losses sustained by
American merchants in consequence of the Orders-in-Coun-
cil. 8 Furthermore, it had eliminated, at least temporarily,
the major source of tension between the two English-speaking
nations. "In both countries," Moore writes with restraint,
"the results of the commission gave satisfaction." 84
CONCLUSION
What can be learned from the above case study of the
three Jay Treaty Commissions? The St. Croix River
Commission suggests that the work of a mixed claims com-
mission is facilitated if the subject matter of the dispute
is both narrow and one which permits some degree of "coin-
8 0 1d. at 119.
81 Id. at ix.
82 MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE 61-62 (1911).
83 1 JAY, THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY 322 (1833).
844 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 161 (1929).
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promise" in the decision-making process. 5 The British
Debts Commission, in fact not a true "mixed" commission,
emphasizes the need for amicable, as well as impartial,
commissioners and the necessity of well-drafted legal stand-
ards. The Maritime Claims Commission demonstrates that
when commissioners perform their duties with speed and
inpartiality, the mixed claims commission is a useful device
for the settlement of international claims and the develop-
ment of customary international law.
Why, then, does the United States, which professes some
interest in this method of adjudicating claims, 86 fail to
press for the establishment of such commissions? 87 Aside
from the advantages of the national commission device,88
two reasons stand out. In the first place, the vast number
of claims that have arisen in the postwar period demand
speedy adjudication. The present writer is of the opinion
that the mixed claims commission could have been modified
in most cases to achieve this result, but the fact of the
matter is that no innovations have been suggested by the
United States that would restyle the device to meet t6e
needs of most present-day claims programs.8 9
Secondly, the establishment and successful operation of
a mixed claims commission requires mutual confidence
between the United States and the foreign country involved,
confidence that each country will select impartial commis-
sioners and will honor the commis.sion's awards. While the
United States might be willing to submit claims against a
85 "[Tihe mixed commission worked best, where the subject matter of the
dispute allowed or encouraged the commissioners to act to some extent as
negotiators rather than as judges, to temper justice with diplomacy, to give
a measure of satisfaction to both sides, for example, in a territorial dispute."
SIJPSON & Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 3 (1959). Compare Moore's
views in the text at note 35 supra.
8 Department of State Memorandum entitled "Nationalization, Intervention
or Other Taking of Property of American Nationals," March 1, 1961, re-
printed in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 166 (1962).
87 See text at and accompanying note 4 supra. See also text accompanying
note 91 hifra.
88 See LILLIcH, INTERNATIONAL CLAI.MS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY
NATIONAL CommIlSSioNs 116-18 (1962).
89Compare Soux, PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 63
(Domke ed. 1958).
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country like Great Britain to a mixed commission, both
countries having a high respect for the judicial process and
a similar legal tradition, it is doubtful whether the United
States would consider entering into such an arrangement
with a Communist or "neutral" country, absent some sudden
thaw in the international climate.90 As Soubbotitch has
explained:
the respective advantages of two devices, the national and the
international claims commissions, will ultimately depend upon the
standing, legal philosophy, foreign policy and financial reliability
of the nation with which the United States is to reach a settlement
agreement. A mixed claims commission with Canada may be
preferable to a lump-sum agreement, whereas a lump-sum agree-
ment with the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria or Egypt would probably be
preferable to a commission composed of one American member,
a member of that other state, and an umpire, whose every award
would have to be enforced against that other state.91
Therefore, while much of the importance of the Jay
Treaty Commissions today lies in their historical significance,
marking as they do the birth of modern international ar-
bitration, they also serve as a reminder that two members
of the international community, when they wisely delegate
to intelligent, patient and moderate men the task of settling
international differences by judicial means, can reasonably
anticipate success. Although it is accurate to say "that most
90 See Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation: A Comparative Approach,
17 U. CHI. L. REv. 458, 475 (1950). See also LILLICH, op. Cit. supra note
88, at 12-15.
91 Soubbotitch, Book Review, 16 RuTGERS L. REV. 634, 637 (1962). The
Department of State, while pressing Canada for a settlement of the so-called
"Gut Dam Claims" or their submission to a tribunal for adjudication,
acquiesed in a 1962 statute authorizing and directing the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission to determine the validity and amount of such claims
for such action as the President may deem appropriate. Gut Dam Claims
Act, 76 Stat. 387 (1962). See S. REP. No. 1750, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962). See also Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Its
Functions and Jurisdiction, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1079, 1097-98 (1962).
Claims must be filed with the Commission on or before October 15, 1963.
FCSC Reg. § 560.1, 27 Fed. Reg. 1129 (1962). It will be interesting to see
whether these claims, which in view of the countries involved are ideally
suited for adjudication by a mixed claims commission, will be handled by
this device or by the lump sum settlement method. For some speculation
on this point, see the author's article which will appear in the Summer
1963 issue of the Iowa Law Review.
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United States nationals with international claims against
foreign countries will be presenting them, at least in the
foreseeable future, to the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission," 92 it is hoped that the Department of State will
choose the establishment of a modernized mixed claims com-
mission whenever the situation warrants, since only by the
repeated resort to such commissions is the needed basis
for an international judicial system likely to develop.
92 LILLICH & CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION
AND PRESENTATION 115-16 (1962).
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